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ST. JOHN'S LAW REVIEW
VOLUME 60 SPRING 1986 NUMBER 3
EXCEPTIONAL CIRCUMSTANCES-QUO
VADIS?t
THE HONORABLE JOHN R. BARTELS*
Article III of the Constitution vests the judicial power of the
United States in one supreme court and in "such inferior Courts as
the Congress may from time to time ordain and establish."' Con-
gress accepted this invitation and through the Judiciary Act of
1789 created a system of trial and intermediate appellate courts.2
t Submitted February 1986.
* United States District Judge, Eastern District of New York. B.A., Johns Hopkins,
1920; L.L.B., Harvard, 1923. For his valuable assistance in the preparation of this article,
the author expresses his deep appreciation to his law clerk John F. Todd, B.A., Hampshire
College, 1979; J.D., Columbia University, 1984.
' U.S. CONsT. art. III, § 1.
2 The Constitutional Convention devoted little consideration to the shape the federal
judiciary was to assume. See H. HART & H. WECHSLER, THE FEDERAL COURTS AND THE FED-
ERAL SYsTEMi 32 (2d ed. 1973); Surrency, A History of Federal Courts, 28 Mo. L. REV. 214,
214 (1963). Because Article III of the Constitution was not self-executing, the First Congress
was thus obligated to establish the judicial system authorized by the Constitution, see Sur-
rency, supra, at 214, and Congress immediately exercised this power to create inferior fed-
eral courts in the First Judiciary Act. C. WRIGHT, THE LAW OF FEDERAL COURTS 4 (4th ed.
1983). The Judiciary Act created one district court for each state, manned by its own dis-
trict judge. H. HART & H. WECHSLER, supra, at 32-33; C. WRIGHT, supra, at 4. The district
courts were entirely courts of original jurisdiction, which were authorized to hear limited
classes of cases, including admiralty and minor criminal cases. Id.; Surrency, supra, at 216.
The First Judiciary Act also established three circuit courts, which held two sessions a
year, without judges of their own. H. HART & H. WECHSLER, supra, at 33. Two justices of the
Supreme Court and the district court judges were to hold circuit court in each district
within these circuits. Id.; Surrency, supra, at 215. The circuit courts had original jurisdiction
in diversity cases where the amount in controversy exceeded $500, most criminal cases, and
large cases to which the United States was a party. C. WRIGHT, supra, at 4. The circuit
courts also had appellate jurisdiction from decisions of the district court in civil cases where
the amount in controversy exceeded $500 and in admiralty cases where the amount ex-
ceeded $300. Id. The Supreme Court retained original jurisdiction as provided by the Con-
stitution, and had appellate jurisdiction over the circuit court in civil cases where the
amount in controversy exceeded $2000, and over the state courts in cases involving a federal
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The jurisdiction of these federal courts originates in Article III,3
and is limited by the specific statutory grants set forth in Title 28
of the United States Code. Article III specifically includes contro-
versies between citizens of different states. For many years, Con-
gress and the Supreme Court have expanded diversity jurisdiction
while at the same time the Court has declined jurisdiction through
the use of the doctrine of abstention.
The expansion of abstention by the courts has evoked tension
between the statutory grants of jurisdiction and the efforts of the
federal courts to avoid the literal terms of those statutes by fash-
ioning judge-made exceptions. In the vast majority of cases, federal
jurisdiction is founded upon one of two grounds: the presence of a
federal question,4 or diversity of citizenship.5 Diversity of citizen-
ship jurisdiction is the most problematic.
Diversity jurisdiction has long been subject to much criticism
from courts and commentators as an unnecessary, burdensome cat-
egory of federal jurisdiction which has outlived any justification it
question. Id. See also Martin v. Hunter's Lessee, 14 U.S. (1 Wheat.) 304 (1816) (appellate
jurisdiction of Supreme Court extends to final judgment or decree of highest court of state
where there is question of law based on federal statute, treaty or Constitution).
' U.S. CONsT. art. III, § 2, cl. 1. This section provides:
The judicial Power shall extend to all Cases, in Law and Equity, arising under this
Constitution, the Laws of the United States, and Treaties made, or which shall be
made, under their Authority; - to all Cases affecting Ambassadors, other public
Ministers and Consuls; - to all Cases of admiralty and maritime Jurisdiction; -
to Controversies to which the United States shall be a Party; - to Controversies
between two or more States; - between a State and Citizens of another State; -
between Citizens of different States; - between Citizens of the same State claim-
ing Lands under Grants of different States, and between a State, or the Citizens
thereof, and foreign States, Citizens or Subjects.
Id.
, 28 U.S.C. § 1331 (1982). Section 1331 provides: "The district courts shall have original
jurisdiction of all civil actions arising under the Constitution, laws, or treaties of the United
States." Id.
5 28 U.S.C. § 1332(a) (1982). Section 1332(a) provides:
The district courts shall have original jurisdiction of all civil actions where the
matter in controversy exceeds the sum or value of $10,000, exclusive of interest
and costs, and is between -
(1) citizens of different States;
(2) citizens of a State and citizens or subjects of a foreign state;
(3) citizens of different States and in which citizens or subjects of a foreign
state are additional parties; and
(4) a foreign state, defined in section 1603(a) of this title, as plaintiff and
citizens of a State or of different States.
EXCEPTIONAL CIRCUMSTANCES
may have once had.' Such criticism has been prompted by the rap-
idly expanding caseloads 'of federal courts due to both the general
increase in federal litigation7, and the Supreme Court's counten-
ancing of expansions of federal jurisdiction in various areas of the
law such as civil rights' and, recently, civil RICO.9 Discontent with
diversity jurisdiction is heightened where there is a state forum ac-
' The traditional justification of diversity jurisdiction is the fear that state courts would
be prejudiced against out-of-state litigants. C. WRIGHT, supra note 2, at 128. Chief Justice
Marshall, in Bank of the United States v. Deveaux, 9 U.S. (5 Cranch) 61 (1809), offered the
following reason for diversity jurisdiction:
However true the fact may be, that the tribunals of the states will administer
justice as impartially as those of the nation, to parties of every description, it is
not less true that the constitution itself either entertains apprehensions on this
subject, or views with such indulgence the possible fears and apprehensions of
suitors, that it has established national tribunals for the decision of controversies
between aliens and a citizen, or between citizens of different states.
Id. at 87.
A number of courts state that the danger of prejudice in a state court toward out-of-
state litigants is no longer viable for diversity jurisdiction. See Evans Transp. Co. v. Scullin
Steel Co., 693 F.2d 715, 717 (7th Cir. 1982). See also American Inst. of Chem. Eng'rs. v.
Reber-Friel Co., 682 F.2d 382, 392 (2d Cir. 1982) (Feinberg, C.J., concurring) (diversity ju-
risdiction in recent years has merely afforded attorneys and clients another opportunity for
forum shopping, which the federal judicial system can no longer afford).
Judge Friendly noted two major objections to diversity jurisdiction: the diversion of
"judge-power" urgently needed for tasks which only the federal courts can handle, and the
federal courts' inability to discharge the important objective of making law. H. FRIENDLY,
FEDERAL JURISDICTION: A GENERAL VIEW 141-42 (1973). Chief Justice Burger describes diver-
sity jurisdiction in the 20th century as an "anachronism that should be eliminated." Burger,
The State of the Federal Judiciary 1979, 65 A.BA. J. 358, 362 (1979). See generally Bartels,
Recent Expansion in Federal Jurisdiction: A Call for Restraint, 55 ST. JOHN'S L. REV. 219,
222 (1981) (since federal judges probably are less qualified than state judges to judge state
law, and their decisions are not binding on the state courts, it is no wonder that the most
often repeated call for jurisdictional reform is the abolition of federal diversity jurisdiction).
7 See Bartels, supra note 6, at 239; Edwards, The Rising Work Load and Perceived
"Bureaucracy" of the Federal Courts: A Causation-Based Approach to the Search for Ap-
propriate Remedies, 68 IOWA L. REv. 871, 874-79 (1983); Judd, The Expanding Jurisdiction
of the Federal Courts, 60 ABA J. 938, 939 (1974).
" See, e.g., Cannon v. University of Chicago, 441 U.S. 677, 709 (1979) (in absence of
explicit right of action in Title IX of Education Amendments of 1972, which were patterned
after Title VI of Civil Rights Act of 1964, Supreme Court implied cause of action). Cf.
Kahane v. Carlson, 527 F.2d 492, 496 (3d Cir. 1975) (violations of civil rights when prisons
fail to provide Jewish inmates with requested Kosher food); Detainees of the Brooklyn
House of Detention for Men v. Malcolm, 520 F.2d 392, 399 (2d Cir. 1975) (violation of civil
rights when two or more pretrial detainees confined in single occupancy cells).
9 See, e.g., Sedima, S.P.L.R. v. Imrex Co., - U.S. , 105 S. Ct. 3275, 3286 (1985)
(less restrictive reading of RICO amply supported by prior cases and general principles sur-
rounding this statute, which is read broadly). See also Comment, The Second Circuit Rubs
Out Civil Rico: Sedima, S.P.L.R. v. Imrex Co., 59 ST. JOHN'S L. REV. 398, 406 (1985) (con-
gressional mandate that RICO be "liberally construed" offers compelling evidence that an
expansive reading be given to statutory language).
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tually hearing the same matter at the same time the federal court
is considering it. In such cases, diversity jurisdiction "can badly
squander the resources of the federal judiciary."' 0
Despite such criticism, the Supreme Court has been reluctant
to create exceptions to the jurisdictional statutes in the face of
Congress's failure to enact amendments.11 The Court has long held
that the pendency of a state court action is no bar to proceedings
on the same matter in federal court, and the Court's opinions con-
tain repeated admonitions that federal courts may not decline the
jurisdiction given by statute. 12 In England v. Louisiana State
Board of Medical Examiners,3 the Court stated that compelling a
party who has properly invoked federal jurisdiction to accept state
court determination of his claims:
[w]ould be at war with the unqualified terms in which Congress,
pursuant to constitutional authorization, has conferred specific
categories of jurisdiction upon the federal courts, and with the
principle that '[w]hen a Federal court is properly appealed to in a
case over which it has by law jurisdiction, it is its duty to take
such jurisdiction . . . . The right of a party plaintiff to choose a
Federal court where there is a choice cannot be properly
denied." 4
As stated in the oft quoted phrase from Colorado River Water
Conservation District v. United States, 5 the federal courts have a
"virtually unflagging obligation . . . to exercise the jurisdiction
given them."' 6
'0 Wright, The Federal Courts and the Nature and Quality of State Law, 13 WAYNE L.
REV. 317, 323 (1967); see Microsoftware Computer Sys. v. Ontel Corp., 686 F.2d 531, 538
(7th Cir. 1982) (district court should have stayed proceeding in deference to state action
because "there would be a grand waste of efforts by both the courts and parties in litigating
the same issues... in two forums at once").
" See Phillips, Diversity Jurisdiction: Problems and a Possible Solution, 14 U. TOL. L.
REV. 747, 750 (1983) (noting various congressional attempts to revise diversity statute).
12 See, e.g., McClellan v. Carland, 217 U.S. 268, 282 (1910) (pending action in state
court no bar to proceedings on same matter in federal court because of concurrent jurisdic-
tion); Cohens v. Virginia 19 U.S. (6 Wheat.) 264, 404 (1821) (Court has no more right to
decline exercise of jurisdiction given, than to usurp that which is not given); see also M.
REDISH, FEDERAL JURISDICTION: TENSION IN THE ALLOCATION OF JUDICIAL POWER 250 (1980)
(originally believed there was absolute right to federal forum where federal jurisdiction
existed).
13 375 U.S. 411 (1964).
14 Id. at 415 (quoting Willcox v. Consol. Gas Co., 212 U.S. 19, 40 (1908)).
424 U.S. 800 (1976).
'6 Id. at 817.
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ABSTENTION
Nevertheless, exceptions have been made to this "virtually un-
flagging obligation" in the form of the abstention' doctrine. 7 The
doctrine of abstention is predicated upon the avoidance of deciding
a constitutional question or upon the notion of comity between
federal and state courts. This principle was first enunciated in
Railroad Commission of Texas v. Pullman Co.' In Pullman, the
Court stayed the pending federal case because a federal constitu-
tional issue was presented which might otherwise be mooted by a
state court determination of pertinent state law.19 Later, in Bur-
" See C. WRIGHT, supra note 2, at 302-30. There are four lines of cases where absten-
tion is recognized: 1) to avoid deciding federal constitutional questions where a case may be
disposed of on state law grounds; 2) to avoid unnecessary conflict with the administration by
a state of its own affairs; 3) to allow states to resolve unsettled questions of state law; and 4)
to ease federal court congestion. Id. at 303.
The first case, known as the Pullman doctrine, applies where state action is being chal-
lenged in federal court and the case may be disposed of on state law grounds. Id.; L. TRIBE,
AMERICAN CONSTITUTIONAL LAW 150-51 (1978). The Pullman doctrine causes lengthy delays
before a case is finally decided on its merits, or is dropped. C. WRIGHT, supra note 2, at 305;
Field, Abstention in Constitutional Cases: The Scope of the Pullman Abstention Doctrine,
122 U. PA. L. REV. 1071, 1085-86 (1974). The second type of abstention, developed in Bur-
ford v. Sun Oil Co., 319 U.S. 315 (1943), is where the federal court defers to the state to
avoid interference with state activities. C. WRIGHT, supra note 2, at 308. In this situation,
the federal court dismisses the action rather than retaining jurisdiction pending a state
court determination. Id.
The third type of abstention, which allows state courts to decide unsettled issues of
state law, was established in the Fifth Circuit and received scattered support at first. Id. at
312-13. The Supreme Court, however, in Clay v. Sun Ins. Office Ltd., 363 U.S. 207 (1960),
ordered abstention and deference to the novel device of certification of the state questions
involved to the highest state court for resolution. C. WRIGHT, supra note 2, at 313. The
Supreme Court strongly endorsed the use of certification in cases where state law is difficult
to ascertain in Lehman Brothers v. Schein, 416 U.S. 386 (1974).
The fourth abstention doctrine, which is to ease federal court congestion, is concerned
with whether a federal court can stay or dismiss an action solely on the ground that there is
a similar action pending in state court which will resolve the controversy. C. WRIGHT, supra
note 2, at 315. The Supreme Court, in Colorado River Water Conservation Dist. v. United
States, 424 U.S. 800 (1976), determined that the pendency of an action in state court does
not bar proceedings concerning the same matters in federal court. This general rule, how-
ever, was not an absolute. C. WRIGHT, supra note 2, at 317. In exceptional circumstances,
the federal action should be dismissed in favor of the pending state action. Id.
,8 312 U.S. 496 (1941).
" Id. at 501. In Pullman, Pullman porters sought injunctive relief, claiming that a
Texas regulation requiring Pullman sleeping cars, previously under the supervision of black
porters, to be placed under the care of white conductors was in violation of the equal protec-
tion clause of the fourteenth amendment. Id. at 497-98. The Supreme Court stated that the
last word on the statutory authority of the Railroad Commission belonged to the Supreme
Court of Texas. Id. at 499-500. The Supreme Court determined that this case presented a
situation where "a federal court of equity is asked to decide an issue by making a tentative
1986]
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ford v. Sun Oil Co.,20 a divided Court sanctioned postponement of
federal jurisdiction where federal review would disrupt or conflict
with the state's policy in establishing its own review system in an
area of public concern. Similarly, in Louisiana Power & Light Co.
v. City of Thibodaux,21 a divided Court extended Burford to per-
mit abstention in a case presenting difficult questions of state law
bearing on policy problems of substantial public import. Finally,
the Court in Younger v. Harris22 held that abstention is proper
where federal jurisdiction is invoked to restrain state criminal
proceedings.
The Court has frequently been divided on abstention and the
vehemence of the dissenting opinions indicate the tension felt by
the Court in fashioning these judge-made exceptions to the district
courts' statutory jurisdiction.23 The concern expressed is not so
answer which may be displaced tomorrow by a state adjudication." Id. at 500. Prior to the
Pullman decision, individual litigants were allowed to question the constitutionality of state
action in federal court, even where the state has not consented to suit under the eleventh
amendment. Field, supra note 17, at 1074-75. Each state program was subject to constitu-
tional attack in federal court, thereby making substantial federal court interference with
such programs possible. Id. at 1075-76. Both the courts and Congress imposed limitations
upon the situation and the manner in which injunctions against state officials should issue.
Id. at 1076. The Pullman doctrine represents one of the most important court-imposed limi-
tations. Id.
The Supreme Court in Pullman ordered the district court to abstain from hearing the
case, and to retain jurisdiction until the state court decided the state issues involved. Pull-
man, 312 U.S. at 501-02. Since the state court may declare that the order was unauthorized
as a matter of law, this prevented the district court from prematurely or unnecessarily de-
ciding a federal constitutional question. Id. at 500.
Abstention of the Pullman type will not be ordered if (1) the state law is clear on its
face; (2) its meaning has already been authoritatively decided by the state courts; or (3) the
constitutional issue would not be avoided or changed no matter how the statute is con-
strued. C. WRIGHT, supra note 2, at 304. A litigant remanded to state court under the Pull-
man abstention doctrine cannot be compelled to submit his federal claims for state court
disposition, and thereby retains the right to a federal determination of federal questions
involved and of the facts on which resolution of such questions depends. L. TRIBE, supra
note 17, at 151.
20 319 U.S. 315, 333-34 (1943).
21 360 U.S. 25, 29-30 (1959).
22 401 U.S. 37, 43-44 (1971).
21 See, e.g., Louisiana Power & Light Co. v. City of Thibodaux, 360 U.S. 25, 36 (1959)
(Brennan, J., dissenting). Justice Brennan argues vigorously against expanding abstention,
stating, "it would obviously wreak havoc with federal jurisdiction if the exercise of that
jurisdiction was a matter of ad hoc discretion of the District Court in each particular case."
Id. (Brennan, J., dissenting). To Justice Brennan, the majority decision reflected "a distaste
for diversity jurisdiction" which prompted him to comment-
I concede the liveliness of the controversy over the utility or desirability of diver-
sity jurisdiction, but it has stubbornly outlasted the many and persistent attacks
against it and the attempts in the Congress to curtail or eliminate it. Until Con-
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much centered upon the federal courts' judicial power to limit stat-
utory jurisdiction as compared to the legislature's power to do SO,2 '
but rather reflects the Supreme Court's sensitivity to encroach-
ment on legislative authority in developing the abstention
doctrine.
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In spite of the rhetoric, the Court nevertheless has continued
to expand the category of cases in which the federal court must
decline its jurisdiction in favor of state court action. This was illus-
trated in Colorado River Water Conservation District v. United
States,25 where the Court enunciated for the first time a decep-
tively broad doctrine of "exceptional circumstances ' 26 justifying a
dismissal of a federal action in favor of a parallel state action in-
volving the same controversy. The Colorado River doctrine is dis-
tinct from the abstention doctrine in that it marks the first time
the Court has accepted as grounds for abstention the federal
court's own administrative concerns rather than "weightier consid-
erations of constitutional adjudication and state-federal rela-
gress speaks otherwise, the federal judiciary has no choice but conscientiously to
render justice for litigants fr6m different States entitled to have their controver-
sies adjudicated in the federal courts.
Id. at 41 (Brennan, J., dissenting). See also Burford, 319 U.S. at 336 (Frankfurter, J., dis-
senting). Justice Frankfurter, stated: "[t]here may be excellent reasons why Congress should
abolish diversity jurisdiction. But, with all deference, it is not a defensible ground for having
this Court by indirection abrogate diversity jurisdiction when, as a matter of fact, Congress
has persistently refused to restrict such jurisdiction . . . ." Id. at 344-45 (Frankfurter, J.,
dissenting).
2, See REDISH, Abstention, Separation of Powers, and the Limits of the Judicial Func-
tion, 94 YALE L.J. 71, 72 n.5 (1984); ZIEGLER, A Reassessment of the Younger Doctrine in
Light of the Legislative History of Reconstruction, 1983 Duke L.J. 987, 990-91.
25 424 U.S. 800 (1976).
26 Note should be made of the confused terminology applied to the exceptional circum-
stances test set out in Colorado River. The Supreme Court avoided using the term "absten-
tion" in order to distinguish the Colorado River test from the traditional categories of ab-
stention. Colorado River, 424 U.S. at 817-18; see C. WRIGHT, W. MILLER & E. COOPER, 17
FEDERAL PRACTICE AND PROCEDURE § 4241, at 448 (1978) (preferring to refer to it as the
"exceptional-circumstances test"); see also Moses H. Cone Memorial Hosp. v. Mercury Con-
str., 460 U.S. 1, 16 (1983)(discusses application of exceptional circumstances test). Other
courts, however, have referred to the test variously as the "pending state action doctrine",
Safeco Ins. Co. v. Miller, 591 F.Supp. 590, 599 (D. Md. 1984), "Colorado River abstention",
AIMS Enters., Inc. v. Muir, 609 F.Supp. 257, 262 (M.D. Pa. 1985), or simply as another form
of abstention, see Alkoff v. Gold, 611 F.Supp. 63, 65 (S.D.N.Y. 1985); C. WRIGHT, W. MILLER
& E. COOPER, supra, § 4247, at 502 (1978) ("fourth type of abstention").
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tions. ''27 This doctrine was subsequently approved by the Court in
Moses H. Cone Memorial Hospital v. Mercury Construction.28
Colorado River involved the McCarren Amendment,29 which is
an amendment to federal laws governing the allocation of water
rights and resolutions of disputes relevant thereto permitting the
federal government to be joined as a defendant in state court adju-
dication of water rights. In Colorado River, there were comprehen-
sive proceedings in the state court in which the federal court was
participating. Nevertheless, the federal government brought suit in
federal court, on behalf of itself and certain Indian tribes, to settle
water rights against private water users. The district court dis-
missed the federal action in favor of the state proceedings and the
court of appeals reversed. The Supreme Court reversed the court
of appeals and affirmed the district court, emphasizing the danger
of piecemeal litigation which the McCarren Amendment sought to
avoid."
Although the Court found the doctrine of abstention inappli-
cable in any of its forms,"1 the Court stated:
[T]here are principles unrelated to considerations of proper con-
stitutional adjudication and regard for federal-state relations
which govern in situations involving the contemporaneous exer-
cise of concurrent jurisdictions .. .by state and federal courts.
These principles rest on considerations of "[w]ise judicial admin-
istration, giving regard to conservation of judicial resources and
comprehensive disposition of litigation."3 2
Referring to the federal court's "virtually unflagging obligation" to
27 Colorado River, 424 U.S. at 818.
28 460 U.S. 1 (1983). Prior to Colorado River, some federal circuit courts had held that
district courts have the inherent power to stay a federal action for reasons of judicial admin-
istration when a similar action is pending in state court. See Aetna State Bank v. Altheimer,
430 F.2d 750, 758 (7th Cir. 1970); Joffe v. Joffe, 384 F.2d 632, 633 (3d Cir. 1967), cert de-
nied. 390 U.S. 1039 (1968); Mottolese v. Kaufman, 176 F.2d 301, 302-03 (2d Cir. 1949). The
Supreme Court finally addressed the issue for the first time in Colorado River, 421 U.S. at
803.
29 66 Stat. 560 (codified at 43 U.S.C. § 666 (1982)).
30 Colorado River, 424 U.S. at 806. Several other factors caused the Supreme Court to
affirm the district court's dismissal of the federal action, including: the absence of any pro-
ceedings in the district court other than the motion to dismiss; the extent to which state
water rights were involved; the 300-mile distance between the district court and the state
court; and the government's existing participation in the state court proceedings. Id. at 819.
31 Id. at 813-17.
32 Id. at 817 (quoting Kerotest Mfg. Co. v. C-O-Two Fire Equip. Co., 342 U.S. 180, 183
(1952)).
[Vol. 60:415
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exercise jurisdiction, the Court emphasized the circumstances per-
mitting the dismissal of a federal suit in favor of a concurrent state
suit for reasons of wise judicial administration stating that these
circumstances "are considerably more limited than the circum-
stances appropriate for abstention," and concluded that "[t]he for-
mer circumstances, though exceptional, do nevertheless exist."
3
Two years later, the Court confusedly applied the exceptional cir-
cumstances test in Will v. Calvert Fire Insurance Co.I4. In Will,
American Mutual sued Calvert in state court and Calvert subse-
quently sued American Mutual in federal court asserting state and
federal claims, including a claim for damages under the Securities
Exchange Act of 1934 over which the federal court has exclusive
jurisdiction. Federal District Court Judge Will stayed the federal
action pending outcome of the state litigation. The Court of Ap-
peals for the Seventh Circuit issued a writ of mandamus directing
Judge Will to proceed with consideration of Calvert's Securities
Act claim. The Supreme Court granted certiorari and reversed.
In a plurality opinion of four members of the Court, Justice
Rehnquist asserted that the court of appeals had improperly inter-
fered with the district court's broad discretion to stay the federal
action.3 5 The decision to stay, according to Justice Rehnquist, "is
largely committed to the discretion of the district court ... even
when matters of substantive federal law are involved in the case.
36
The four dissenters strongly criticized the plurality opinion for re-
fusing to apply the narrower exceptional circumstances test of Col-
orado River, under which the district court would be required to
proceed, finding that "there lurks an ominous potential for the ab-
dication of federal-court jurisdiction in the [plurality] opinion's
disturbing indifference to the 'virtually unflagging obligation of the
federal courts to exercise the jurisdiction given them.' ,,s7
-1 Id. at 817-18. The Court then went on to identify four factors to be considered in
determining whether such exceptional circumstances are present: which court first assumed
jurisdiction over property involved in a suit; the inconvenience of the federal forum; desira-
bility of avoiding piecemeal litigation; and the order in which the concurrent jurisdiction
was obtained in the concurrent forums. Id. at 818.
437 U.S. 655 (1978).
" Id. at 662-63. Justice Rehnquist stated that "a district court is 'under no compulsion
to exercise [its] jurisdiction,' where the controversy may be settled more expeditiously in the
state court." Id. (quoting Brillhart v. Excess Ins. Co., 316 U.S. 491, 494 (1942)). But see
Calvert, 437 U.S. at 671 (Brennan, J., dissenting) (Brilihart brought under 28 U.S.C. § 2201
which specifically states that assumption of jurisdiction is discretionary).
36 Calvert, 437 U.S. at 664.
31 Id. at 669 (Brennan, J., dissenting) (quoting Colorado River Water Conservation
1986]
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The concurrence of Justice Blackmun gave the plurality its
fifth vote in favor of reversal, however, the concurrence failed to
support Justice Rehnquist's reasoning. Rather, Justice Blackmun
believed that reversal was proper on the ground that the court of
appeals should have remanded the case, rather than compel Judge
Will to proceed, so that the district court could reconsider its deci-
sion in light of Colorado River which was issued after the district
court's decision to stay.a8
While the majority in Calvert appeared to favor the stricter
view of Colorado River, Justice Rehnquist's plurality opinion
favoring broad discretion to decline jurisdiction left the excep-
tional circumstances test in a state of doubt.39 The confusion con-
tinued until 1983 when the Court, by a clear majority, reviewed
and reaffirmed the Colorado River decision in Moses H. Cone Me-
morial Hospital v. Mercury Construction.40
In Cone, the hospital sued Mercury in state court for a declar-
atory judgment regarding rights and liabilities under a contract for
the construction of an addition to the hospital. Shortly thereafter,
Mercury brought its own suit in federal court to compel arbitration
under section 4 of the Federal Arbitration Act,4 which action the
district court stayed pending resolution of the state court suit. The
stay was appealed to the Supreme Court which reversed the stay
order.
Before reaching the merits, the Court rejected the argument
that Calvert undermined the exceptional circumstances test, point-
ing out that the Calvert decision supported application of Colo-
rado River, and that Calvert concerned a significantly different
Dist. v. United States, 424 U.S. 800, 817 (1976)).
Id. at 667-68 (Blackmun, J., concurring).
' See Zellen v. Second New Haven Bank, 454 F. Supp. 1359, 1364 (D. Conn. 1978)
("the case law concerning the question of when a federal court can properly invoke the
policy to dismiss a case is still uncertain and unformed" after Calvert). While some courts,
in view of the lack of a clear majority in Calvert, continued to apply the stricter Colorado
River test, see Western Auto Supply Co. v. Anderson, 610 F.2d 1126, 1127 (3d Cir. 1979);
Heritage Land Co. v. FDIC, 572 F. Supp. 1265, 1266 n.1 (W.D. Okla. 1983), others have
viewed Calvert as according much broader discretion than originally intended in Colorado
River to stay federal suits in favor of parallel state court litigation. See Microsoftware Com-
puter Sys. v. Ontel Corp., 686 F.2d 531, 537 (7th Cir. 1982); M. REDISH, supra note 12, at
253; Comment, Federal Court Stays and Dismissals In Deference to Duplicative State
Court Litigation: The Impact of Moses H. Cone Memorial Hospital v. Mercury Construc-
tion, 46 OHIO ST. L. J. 435, 445-47 (1985).
40 460 U.S. 1 (1983).
"I United States Arbitration Act of 1925, 43 Stat. 883 (codified at 9 U.S.C. § 4 (1982)).
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standard applicable to cases involving writs of mandamus. 42 Turn-
ing to a review of the exceptional circumstances test, the Court
added two new factors to the four previously set out in Colorado
River.43 These factors are: whether state or federal law supplies the
rule of decision, and whether the state court proceeding will ade-
quately protect the rights of the party seeking to invoke federal
jurisdiction.44 Applying the Colorado River factors together with
the two new factors, the Court found that the balance of circum-
stances weighed against staying the federal proceedings.45
Since duplicative litigation is the underlying concern of the
test, there must be pending state court litigation capable of ad-
dressing the essential issues existing at the same time the federal
court declines jurisdiction.4  This requirement differs from the
traditional categories of abstention where there need not be a par-
allel state suit actually pending at the time the federal court de-
clines jurisdiction. 47 The contemporaneous exercise of jurisdiction
by two federal courts presents a more deferential standard not re-
quiring exceptional circumstances.48 Since the problem of depriv-
ing a litigant of his right to a federal court does not arise in the
latter case, courts are considerably freer to decline jurisdiction in
favor of a parallel action first instituted in another federal court
for the sake of avoiding duplicative litigation. 49 The general rule
when two federal courts are involved is, therefore, "that in the ab-
sence of sound reasons the second action should give way to the
first." 50
42 Cone, 460 U.S. at 17-18.
43 See supra text accompanying note 33.
44 Cone, 460 U.S. at 23-27.
45 Id. at 26-27.
40 See infra notes 90-91 and accompanying text.
47 See C. WRIGHT, IV. MILLER & E. COOPER, supra note 26, § 4242, at 470; cf. Harris
County Comm'rs Court v. Moore, 420 U.S. 77, 83 (1975) (more likely to order abstention
when state action pending, implying state action not required).
4" See Colorado River, 424 U.S. at 817 ("as between federal district courts, however,
though no precise rule has evolved, the general principle is to avoid duplicative litigation");
Kerotest Mfg. Co. v. C-O-Two Fire Equip. Co., 342 U.S. 180, 183-84 (1952); Landis v. North
Am. Co., 299 U.S. 248, 254 (1936).
49 See Colorado River, 424 U.S. at 817.
50 Semmes Motors, Inc. v. Ford Motor Co., 429 F.2d 1197, 1203 (2d Cir. 1970). The
Semmes court stated:
[Any exception for cases where the same party is plaintiff in both actions would
entail the danger that plaintiffs may engage in forum shopping or, more accu-
rately, judge shopping. When they see a storm brewing in the first court, they may
try to weigh anchor and set sail for the hopefully more favorable waters of another
1986]
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There is little doubt that parallel litigation is wasteful and du-
plicative regardless of whether the concurrent jurisdiction is state-
federal or wholly federal. The question presented in the state-fed-
eral context is, therefore, at what point is the duplicative litigation
so wasteful that it warrants depriving the federal plaintiff of his
statutory right to a federal forum. Since the Supreme Court's ex-
ceptional circumstances test vaguely answers this question, there is
no guidance for lower courts.
The exceptional circumstances test is ambiguous, to say the
least.5 ' While the Supreme Court emphasizes the narrowness of the
test, the Court also insists that it be applied with flexibility and
"with a view to the realities of the case at hand. '5 2 The problem
lies in the subjective nature of this balancing test; specifically,
what is exceptional to one judge may not be exceptional to
another.
53
district.
Id.
51 Recently, the doctrine of exceptional circumstances was, in effect, partially applied to
justify rather than to deny federal jurisdiction in enjoining the execution of a judgment in
the amount rendered by a state court.
In Texaco Inc. v. Pennzoil Co., 784 F.2d 1133 (2d Cir. 1986), the federal court refused to
abstain from exercising jurisdiction in holding that the Texas lien and bond provisions of
the statute involved were unconstitutional as applied. In that case, a judgment was obtained
in the Texas state court in favor of Pennzoil Company in the amount of $11.12 billion, for
which it was impossible for Texaco to meet the mandatory bond requirement in order to
appeal. The court held that due process required injunctive relief in order to render mean-
ingful Texaco's right to appeal. While concern for federalism, comity, and judicial economy
suggested abstention, the court indicated that abstention was inappropriate. The decision
partly rested upon the extraordinary circumstances of the case, which appeared from the
unprecedented amount of the judgment and the inability of the debtor under those circum-
stances to comply with Texas law.
52 Cone, 460 U.S. at 21. The Court, repeating the warning in Colorado River, stated:
[T]he decision whether to dismiss.., does not rest on a mechanical checklist, but
on a careful balancing of the important factors as they apply in a given case, with
the balance heavily weighted in favor of the exercise of jurisdiction. The weight to
be given to any one factor may vary greatly from case to case, depending on the
particular setting of the case.
Id. at 16.
'3 See Microsoftware Computer Sys. v. Ontel Corp., 686 F.2d 531, 536-37 (7th Cir.
1982). In Microsoftware, the majority found that the case presented circumstances so excep-
tional that it was an abuse of discretion not to abstain, id. at 538, while the dissent termed
the case "distinctly unexceptional." Id. at 540 (Doyle, J., dissenting). See also Thibodaux,
360 U.S. at 36 (Brennan, J., dissenting) (it would wreak havoc if exercise of federal jurisdic-
tion was matter for ad hoc discretion of district court); Forehand v. First Alabama Bank,
727 F.2d 1033, 1035-36 (11th Cir. 1984) (compare majority and dissenting opinions review-
ing district court abstention under Colorado River); Mobil Oil Corp. v. City of Long Beach,
578 F. Supp. 1197, 1199 (C.D. Cal. 1984) (dismissed federal claim due to concurrent state
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CASES APPLYING THE TEST
Perhaps the most satisfactory application of the test occurs in
cases such as Colorado River, which involve a large number of liti-
gants with closely related claims who are pursuing action in state
court at the time federal jurisdiction is invoked. For example, in
Arkwright-Boston Manufacturers Mutual Insurance Co. v. City of
New York, 54 following a blackout in New York City's garment dis-
trict, several insurance companies, subrogated to the claims of
those affected by the outage, brought suit against the City and its
agencies for having negligently caused the power failure. The dis-
trict court dismissed in favor of some fifty state court actions then
pending, brought by others affected by the blackout against the
same defendants, which actions had been placed under the super-
vision of a single state court judge. The Court of Appeals for the
Second Circuit affirmed noting the "distinct likeness to the pattern
of Colorado River.' 5
5
The court of appeals emphasized that "[a]s in Colorado River
the danger of piecemeal litigation is the paramount consideration
in this case,"5' 6 pointing out that if the federal court did not ab-
stain, the numerous defendants would be forced to defend the
complex litigation on two fronts and run the risk of a destructive
race to judgment and further litigation over inconsistent disposi-
tions in concurrent forums. 57 On the other hand, the Arkwright-
Boston court noted that, like Colorado River:
[T]he instant case involves hundreds of claims and numerous par-
ties, and implicates significant local interests. The state litigation
has already been assigned to a single state-court judge. Thus it
appears likely that the numerous claims arising out of the black-
out will be consolidated for all purposes, including discovery and
joint trial, in a single state-court action. 8
In addition to wasteful duplication which is present whenever
there is parallel litigation, such multi-claim cases arising out of a
single incident present special problems of administration of com-
plex litigation, avoidance of piecemeal litigation, and providing
proceeding for reason of wise judicial administration), rev'd, 772 F.2d 534 (9th Cir. 1985)
(lower court dismissal inconsistent with narrow boundaries of Colorado River).
84 762 F.2d 205 (2d Cir. 1985).
55 Id. at 212.
56 Id. at 211.
57 Id.
58 Id.
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comprehensive disposition of the numerous claims and defenses of
the many litigants.5 These concerns appear to be more urgent
than the concerns of duplicative litigation present in the garden-
variety diversity case which ends up in federal court. However, it is
in just such garden-variety cases that the test is most frequently
applied.
Some courts have sought to limit application of the test to
cases in which federal statutes may be read to indicate a congres-
sional intent favoring, in the particular case, a dismissal in favor of
state court adjudication."' The Third Circuit, for example, has
clearly embraced this 'federal policy' limitation, summarizing the
test as follows:
The Supreme Court has recognized a narrow exception to the ba-
sic rule, where it has been able to identify, in other Congres-
sional legislation, a tempering of the policy of enforcing the
plaintiffs choice of a federal forum in favor of a policy of avoid-
ing duplicative and inconvenient litigation."
While this limitation on the exceptional circumstances test
seems to accord more respect to the legislature's authority to
amend the jurisdictional statutes, 2 such limitation has not become
a central part of the test. Although Cone emphasized the impor-
tance of a "clear federal policy" favoring dismissal, the Cone court
did not make the existence of such a policy an absolute prerequi-
site to application of the test, and other courts have not recognized
such a limitation. The question of whether the test should be lim-
" See Liberty Mut. Ins. Co. v. Foremost-McKesson Inc., 751 F.2d 475, 477 (1st Cir.
1985) (insurance action concerning coverage of manufacturer's liability for DES injuries dis-
missed in favor of state suit involving all of manufacturer's insurers to avoid problems of
piecemeal litigation and inconsistent decisions); Schomber v. Jewel Cos., 614 F. Supp. 210,
218 (N.D. 111. 1985) (dismissal in favor of some 200 state court suits arising out of salmonella
poisoning in view of "complexity of this litigation and of the extraordinary steps already
taken by the state court to supervise the consolidated cases").
60 See Moses H. Cone Memorial Hosp. v. Mercury Constr. Corp., 460 U.S. 1, 16; Will v.
Calvert Fire Ins., 437 U.S. 665, 673 (Brennan, J., dissenting). In both cases, Justice Brennan
asserted that Colorado River rested heavily on "[tihe clear federal policy" evinced by the
McCarran Amendment favoring state court adjudication of water rights. Calvert, 437 U.S. at
673; see also Cone, 460 U.S. at 16 (same).
"1 Harris v. Pernsley, 755 F.2d 338, 345 (3d Cir.), cert denied, 106 S.Ct. 331 (1985)
(emphasis added). In Pernsley, the court of appeals refused to permit a stay under Colorado
River in part because "[n]o federal statute suggests a congressional policy tempering in any
way the basic policy of affording plaintiffs a choice of forum." Pernsley, 755 F.2d at 346. See
Forehand v. First Alabama Bank, 727 F.2d 1033, 1036 (11th Cir. 1984); United States v.
SCM Corp., 615 F. Supp. 411, 419 (D. Md. 1985).
2 See supra note 24 and accompanying text.
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ited to cases where Congress has evinced a policy favoring dismis-
sal in favor of state proceedings must await a future decision from
the Supreme Court.
OPEN-ENDED NATURE
A discussion of some of the cases in which Colorado River and
Cone have been applied or rejected is useful in highlighting the
concerns discussed above. One problem lies in delineating the fac-
tors relevant when applying the test. While some courts, despite
the Supreme Court's directions to the contrary, have rigidly ap-
plied the six factors presented in Colorado River and Cone in the
manner of a checklist,0 3 other courts have felt free to consider a
wider range of circumstances not expressly sanctioned in the Su-
preme Court's opinions. These courts often refer to the test as
"open-ended in nature" 4 and "not limited to" the factors found in
the Supreme Court's opinions.6 5 Courts have considered, for exam-
ple, the "peculiarly local" nature of a dispute;6 6 whether dismissal
will promote settlement;6 7 and the fact that the parallel state suit
has been bogged down in state court for an extended period.6 8
Although the Supreme Court itself did not characterize the
test as open-ended, authority to look beyond the factors found in
Colorado River and Cone is implicit in the Court's emphasis on
flexibility and case-by-case determinations. The open-ended na-
ture of the test is further suggested by the fact that the Cone
Court added factors not mentioned in Colorado River and noted
with approval still another factor to be considered in an appropri-
63 See Kruse v. Snowshoe Co., 715 F.2d 120, 123-24 (4th Cir. 1983), cert. denied, 465
U.S. 1065 (1984); Safeco Ins. Co. v. Miller, 591 F. Supp. 590, 598-99 (D. Md. 1984).
8' North Am. Van Lines, Inc. v. State Bd. of Tax Comm'rs, 590 F. Supp. 311, 317 (N.D.
Ind. 1984); see Voktas, Inc. v. Central Soya Co., 689 F.2d 103, 107 (7th Cir. 1982) ("open-
ended nature" of test).
" Barron v. Spectrum Emergency Care, Inc., 619 F. Supp. 1011, 1014 (N.D. Ga. 1985).
ee Board of Educ. v. Bosworth, 713 F.2d 1316, 1321 (7th Cir. 1983); see Rattner v.
Board of Trustees, 611 F. Supp. 648, 654 (S.D.N.Y. 1985); Delaney v. Capitol Hill Anesthe-
sia Assoc., 602 F. Supp. 1069, 1070 (D.D.C. 1985); Northeast Mines, Inc. v. Town of
Smithtown, 584 F. Supp. 112, 116 (E.D.N.Y. 1984).
6' See Calvert, 437 U.S. at 663; Armco, Inc. v. Moore Exploration, Inc., 603 F. Supp. 1,
2 (S.D. Tex. 1984).
18 See Los Angeles NAACP v. Los Angeles Unified School Dist., 518 F. Supp. 1053,
1062 (C.D. Cal. 1981); cf. Coatings, Inc. v. National Cold Drawn, Inc., 611 F. Supp. 958, 961
(E.D. Wis. 1985) (court denied stay of federal proceedings where moving party failed to
show case would be decided in parallel state action).
1986]
ST. JOHN'S LAW REVIEW [Vol. 60:415
ate case: the "vexatious or reactive nature" of the litigation."
DIFFERENT INTERPRETATIONS
"Vexatiousness" provides a good example of a related problem
inherent in the test, namely the range of interpretation possible
even with the factors listed by the Court. Vexatiousness, bad faith,
or "procedural gamesmenship", 70 have been cited as reasons to
stay or dismiss in favor of state proceedings. Courts have frowned
on a state court defendant who has jeopardized his state court case
through procedural or tactical errors and attempts to salvage his
position, where removal is not possible, by bringing a federal suit. 1
Similarly, courts have been impatient with a state court plaintiff
who, having failed to achieve results in state court, decides to try
federal waters in hopes of more favorable treatment.72 As one court
stated "[plaintiff] is asking this Court to short-circuit a parallel
six-year old state court suit. . . . [He] chose the state court forum
• . . [and] must live with his original choice. . . . Other exam-
ples exist describing the range of interpretation given to the Su-
preme Court's factors. Courts have treated the "adequacy of the
69 Cone, 460 U.S. at 18 n.20. This factor originally was applied by the district court and
the Seventh Circuit to uphold dismissal of the Calvert Fire Insurance case following re-
mand by the Supreme Court. Calvert Fire Ins. Co. v. American Mut. Reinsur. Co., 600 F.2d
1228, 1234 (7th Cir. 1979), af'g 459 F. Supp. 859 (N.D. Ill. 1978).
7' Hartford Accident and Indem. Co. v. Hop-On Int'l Corp., 568 F. Supp. 1569, 1573
(S.D.N.Y. 1983).
7 See, e.g., Heritage Land Co. v. F.D.I.C., 572 F. Supp. 1265, 1267 (W.D. Okla. 1983).
In Heritage Land, the plaintiff, Heritage, was a defendant in a state court action to fore-
close on properties held by Heritage. FDIC was also named a defendant in the state court in
its role as receiver of Penn Square Bank which held Heritage's mortgages on the properties.
FDIC cross-petitioned in state court against Heritage and then moved for summary judg-
ment. In response to FDIC's motion, Heritage alleged a breach of contract between Heritage
and Penn Square Bank, and almost immediateiy thereafter filed the federal suit against
FDIC based on the same alleged breach of contract. The federal district court, in dismissing
the suit under Colorado River, noted the various times when Heritage should have raised its
breach of contract claim in the state proceedings, concluding, "[y]et, inexplicably, Heritage
failed to raise these matters [in state court] until the FDIC moved for summary judgment
on its cross-petition. Then, after it had flailed about in the state court for months and as it
was facing imminent judgment, Heritage sought refuge in this Court." Id. at 1267. See also
Byer Museum of Arts v. North River Ins. Co., 622 F. Supp. 1381, 1386-87 (N.D. Ill. 1985)
(dismissing federal action as mere "tactical maneuver"); Barron v. Spectrum Emergency
Care, Inc., 619 F. Supp. 1011, 1014 n.3 (N.D. Ga. 1985) (concern for judicial resources belied
by lack of timeliness in filing motion); Mobil Oil Corp. v. City of Long Beach, 578 F. Supp.
1197, 1202 (race to courthouse considered in decision on abstention), rev'd, 772 F.2d 534,
540-43 (9th Cir. 1985).
72 See Telesco v. Telesco Fuel & Masons, 765 F.2d 356, 363 (2d Cir. 1985).
73 Thompson v. Ashner, 601 F. Supp. 471, 475 (N.D. Ill. 1985).
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state court" factor not only to mean the state court's legal power to
grant the relief sought, as was intended in Cone,74 but also to mean
the administrative competency of the state court to handle the
matter expeditiously.7 5 This interpretation was clearly not in-
tended by the Cone Court.76
OVERLAP OF JURISDICTIONAL DOCTRINES
The exceptional circumstances test also involves some overlap
and confusion with other jurisdictional doctrines. It should be
noted that the test itself incorporates concerns typically associated
with the doctrine of forum non conveniens77 and the long estab-
lished rule requiring a court to refrain from asserting jurisdiction
over a res over which another court previously has assumed juris-
diction. 8
The catch-all or open-ended nature of the test allows courts to
resort to bits and pieces of other doctrines which otherwise are in-
applicable to the case. Using aspects of several doctrines to rein-
force each other, one court has held that "the Burford abstention
doctrine, the priority factor from the Colorado River analysis, and
the source-of-law factor from Calvert all point in favor of absten-
tion.17 9 Similarly, courts have mixed into the exceptional circum-
71 Cone, 460 U.S. at 26-27.
76 See, e.g., Los Angeles NAACP v. Los Angeles Unified School Dist., 518 F. Supp.
1053, 1062 (C.D. Cal. 1981), rev'd, 714 F.2d 946 (9th Cir. 1983), cert. denied, 467 U.S. 1209
(1984). The Unified School court refused to stay the federal action despite comprehensive
and longstanding state court litigation, finding "the fact that the [parallel state action] has
been pending in the state courts for 18 years is a factor which militates in favor of this
Court's exercising [jurisdiction] . . . . "Id. Cf. Coatings, Inc. v. National Cold Drawn, Inc.,
611 F. Supp. 958, 961 (E.D. Wis. 1985) (plaintiff asked court to take judicial notice of repu-
tation of state court system in considering jurisdiction of federal court).
76 Cone, 460 U.S. at 26 (by the "inadequacy of the state-court proceeding... [wle are
not to be understood to impeach the competence or procedures of the North Carolina
courts").
77 See Gulf Oil Corp. v. Gilbert, 330 U.S. 501 (1947); Hartford Accident & Indem. Co. v.
Hop-On Int'l Corp., 568 F. Supp. 1569, 1574 n.12 (S.D.N.Y. 1983); see also Mottolese v.
Kaufman, 176 F.2d 301 (2d Cir. 1949) (diversity action always subject to motion for forum
non conveniens).
78 See Princess Lida v. Thompson, 305 U.S. 456, 466 (1939); United States v. SCM
Corp., 615 F. Supp. 411, 416 n.9 (D. Md. 1985) ("This 'factor' might be viewed as a restate-
ment of the rule" in Princess Lida).
79 Adams v. Pennsylvania Chiropractic Soc., 563 F. Supp. 434, 437 (M.D. Pa. 1983). The
district court's holding in Shean v. White, 620 F. Supp. 1329, 1331 (N.D. Tex. 1985) evi-
dences the patch-work approach that while "it is far from clear that abstention is warranted
under any of the doctrines discussed above ... [c]onsideration of all the doctrines collec-
tively, however, weighs in favor of exercising abstention here." Id. See also Tovar v.
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stances test comity considerations which the Supreme Court indi-
cated were not relevant under Colorado River. 0
The test has also provided an excuse for introducing factors
which the Supreme Court has held, in other respects, to be im-
proper grounds for declining jurisdiction. Thus, for example, while
the Cone Court included as a factor whether state or federal law
provides the rule of decision, 81 the Court has also clearly held that
the difficulty of a state law issue is not grounds for refusing to
exercise jurisdiction.82 Nevertheless, district courts applying the
exceptional circumstances test have found this to be a relevant fac-
tor weighing in favor of dismissal. 3
Some courts have gone even further by dismissing suits which
were found to be essentially a "local matter" with which the fed-
eral court should not concern itself.8 4 Finally, at least one court has
found, without justification, authority in Colorado River to deny a
federal forum to litigants because the court believed the underly-
ing concern of the diversity statute to protect out-of-state litigants
was not present. In Byer Museum of Arts v. North River Insur-
ance Co., the district court dismissed the case under Colorado
River and found that "the plaintiffs .. .are undeserving of the
protections afforded by diversity jurisdiction." 5
Billmeyer, 609 F.2d 1291, 1293 (9th Cir. 1979) ("The district court in this cases applied to
[Colorado River] a gloss derived from Younger v. Harris... and Juidice v. Vail, [430 U.S.
327 (1977)]") (applying Younger abstention), cert. denied., 105 S. Ct. 223 (1984); Mobil Oil
Corp. v. City of Long Beach, 578 F. Supp. 1197, 1202-03 (C.D. Cal. 1984) (similarity to
Younger type abstention warrants dismissal under Colorado River).
" See Colorado River, 424 U.S. at 817-18; supra notes 25-26 and accompanying text.
Compare Illinois Bell Tel. Co. v. Illinois Commerce Comm'n, 740 F.2d 566, 571 (7th Cir.
1984) ("comity is not relevant to a decision whether to stay the federal suit," but rather only
considerations of wise judicial administration), [and] United States v. SCM Corp., 615 F.
Supp. 411, 416 (D. Md. 1985) ("[t]he principles governing contemporaneous exercise of con-
current jurisdiction are unrelated to considerations of proper constitutional adjudication or
regard for federal-state relations"), with Schomber v. Jewell Cos., 614 F. Supp. 210, 215
(N.D. Ill. 1985) (exceptional circumstances test involves "considerations of judicial economy
and federal-state comity").
1 Cone, 460 U.S. at 26.
82 Thibodaux, 360 U.S. at 27.
8 See Arkwright-Boston Mfrs. Mut. v. City of New York, 762 F.2d 205, 211 (2d Cir.
1985); Delaney v. Capitol Hill Anesthesia Assoc., 602 F. Supp. 1069, 1070 (D.D.C. 1985);
Safeco Ins. Co. v. Miller, 591 F. Supp. 590, 599 (D. Md. 1984); cf. Burger, supra note 6, at
362 (state judges better equipped to decide questions of state law).
8' See Rattner v. Board of Trustees, 611 F. Supp. 648, 654 (S.D.N.Y. 1985); Delaney v.
Capitol Hill Anesthesia Assoc., 602 F. Supp. 1069, 1070 (D.D.C. 1985); Northeast Mines Inc.
v. Town of Smithtown, 584 F. Supp. 112, 116 (E.D.N.Y. 1984).
88 See Byer Museum of Arts v. North River Ins. Co., 622 F. Supp. 1381, 1385 (N.D. Ill.
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The Byer Museum case presents one of the most troubling as-
pects of the exceptional circumstances test; one which completely
ignores the supposedly unflagging obligation to exercise jurisdic-
tion. A plaintiff's right to bring a diversity suit in the federal court
of his home state, while subject to criticism, 6 is nevertheless clear
from the terms of the diversity statute. The rationale of Byer Mu-
seum, making the very fact of diversity jurisdiction a factor weigh-
ing for dismissal, runs directly counter to the terms of the statute
and long standing practice. As the court in Byer Museum acknowl-
edged, federal courts are "not to treat diversity litigants as second-
class litigants. 8 7 One is hard pressed to find support in Colorado
River or its progeny for the authority assumed by the court in Byer
Museum to determine which litigants are "undeserving" of a fed-
eral forum.
PARALLEL ACTIONS
Still other uncertainties exist; decisions conflict on just how
parallel the state and federal actions must be before the federal
1985). Byer Museum, an Illinois citizen, was sued in Illinois state court by North River
Insurance over the coverage of certain insurance policies. In the course of what the district
court termed "some elaborate strategic posturing within the state and federal judicial sys-
tems", Byer brought the parallel federal action, basing jurisdiction on diversity of citizen-
ship. Id. at 1382. The court stated:
As citizens of Illinois, the plaintiffs (state court defendants) are undeserving of the
protections afforded by diversity jurisdiction. The [state court] is quite capable of
acting impartially towards each of the federal plaintiffs. Moreover, the Court be-
lieves that the plaintiffs have circumvented Congress' express desire to keep liti-
gants, such as the plaintiffs, out of federal court. Congress, in enacting the re-
moval provision, 28 U.S.C. § 1441(b), specifically provided that actions cannot be
removed from state to federal court if the state defendants are citizens of the state
in which the state litigation is brought. That is exactly the position plaintiffs are
in.
Because plaintiffs have been foreclosed by Congress from removing this action
and because the traditional justification for diversity jurisdiction is not present,
the Court holds that there is no substantial federal interest served by proceeding
with this case.
Id. at 1385.
." See supra note 6; see also American Law Institute, Study of the Division of Juris-
diction Between State and Federal Courts 124-25 (1968) (right of in-state plaintiff to insti-
tute diversity action against out-of-state defendant not responsive to any acceptable justifi-
cation for diversity jurisdiction); Marsh, Diversity Jurisdiction: Scapegoat of Overcrowded
Federal Courts, 48 BROoKLYN L. REV. 197, 221-22 (1982) (modifying diversity statute to bar
in-state plaintiffs from bringing diversity actions, paralleling removal statute, 28 U.S.C. §
1414(b), has received wide support).
87 See Byer Museum, 622 F. Supp. at 1385; Evans Transp. Co. v. Scullin Steel Co., 693
F.2d 715, 717 (7th Cir. 1982).
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court will consider dismissal in favor of the state litigation. While
some courts have required strict identity of parties and issues,8
others have stayed the federal action in favor of a state court pro-
ceeding because "the goals in both proceedings are the same," al-
though the parties were not the same and the federal plaintiff had
raised issues not found in the state suit.89
BURDEN OF PROOF
An important procedural aspect of the test, which is subject to
conflicting decisions, concerns the party who must carry the bur-
den of persuasion on a motion to stay or dismiss the federal action.
Given the Supreme Court's emphasis on the narrowness of the test
and the "virtually unflagging obligation" to exercise jurisdiction,
most courts assume that the moving party must persuade the court
to decline jurisdiction.9" However, a number of courts have re-
versed the burden, requiring the non-moving party to show cause
why the federal action should not be stayed or dismissed.9 1 Such a
shift in the burden of persuasion obviously creates a presumption
in favor of dismissal which appears to conflict with the supposedly
"unflagging obligation" to retain jurisdiction.
DISCRETION
A related issue is the discretion to be accorded the district
court in deciding to grant or deny dismissal upon review by the
court of appeals. Although the Supreme Court has generally em-
phasized the narrowness of the abstention doctrine,92 the Court
has never clarified the standard appropriate for review of a district
court's decision to abstain. 3 The standard of review has been
equally unclear under the exceptional circumstances test.
The district court's discretion to apply the exceptional circum-
" See, e.g., Crawley v. Hamilton County Comm'rs, 744 F.2d 28, 31 (6th Cir. 1984) (re-
quiring strict identity of parties and issues).
89 North Am. Van Lines, Inc. v. State Bd. of Tax Comm'rs, 590 F. Supp. 311, 314 (N.D.
Ind. 1984).
90 See, e.g., St. Paul Fire & Marine Ins. Co. v. Trenor Corp., 614 F. Supp. 525, 528
(E.D.N.C. 1985).
91 Klingenberg v. Bobbin Publications, Inc., 530 F. Supp. 173 (D.D.C. 1982); Bagley v.
Florida First Nat'l Bank, 508 F. Supp. 11 (M.D. Fla. 1980).
"2 See Colorado River, 424 U.S. at 813; County of Allegheny v. Frank Mashuda Co., 360
U.S. 185, 188-89 (1959).
'3 See Traughber v. Beauchane, 760 F.2d 673, 675 (6th Cir. 1985) (comparing standards
of review for abstention generally in various circuits).
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stances test would seem to be narrow in view of the Colorado River
Court's assertion that the circumstances permitting dismissal be-
cause of a parallel state proceeding "are considerably more limited
than the circumstances appropriate for abstention"9 ' and that
"[o]nly the clearest of justifications will warrant dismissal." 95 How-
ever, the plurality in Hill v. Calvert created doubt in this area by
asserting that in cases of concurrent state-federal jurisdiction, the
district court is "under no compulsion to exercise that jurisdic-
tion" 8 and the "decision in such circumstances is largely commit-
ted to the discretion of the district court. '97
The confusion which followed in the wake of Calvert9" was
cleared somewhat by the Cone decision which reiterated the nar-
rowness of the exceptional circumstances test and specifically re-
jected the broad discretion seemingly given to district courts to
stay or dismiss a suit in favor of parallel state proceedings. As the
Cone Court stated, "[y]et to say that the district court has discre-
tion is not to say that its decision is unreviewable; such discretion
must be exercised under the relevant standard prescribed by this
Court."99
Apparently this statement was insufficient because confusion
nevertheless ensues and many courts continue to display broad
discretion to abstain under Colorado River.100 Courts feel free to
abstain in cases brought under the Declaratory Judgement Act,
which itself provides that federal jurisdiction is discretionary.' 0' In
contrast, other courts have held that "[a]lthough the court has dis-
cretion to grant or deny relief authorized by the Declaratory
Judgement Act,. . . where the court's denial of relief is based on
principles of 'wise judicial administration,' its discretion is limited,
and must be exercised within the narrow boundaries drawn by Col-
orado River.' ' 0 2
94 Colorado River, 424 U.S. at 818.
" Id. at 819.
Calvert, 437 U.S. at 662 (quoting Brillhart v. Excess Ins. Co., 316 U.S. 491, 494
(1942)).
*7 Calvert, 437 U.S. at 664.
11 See supra note 39 and accompanying text.
11 Cone, 460 U.S. at 19.
1o See, e.g., Schomber v. Jewell Cos., 614 F. Supp. 210, 216 (N.D. 111. 1985) (abstention
within district court's discretion).
,o, See 28 U.S.C. § 2201 (1982); Safeco Ins. Co. v. Miller, 591 F. Supp. 590, 599 (D. Md.
1984) ("abstention under pending state action doctrine is uniquely appropriate").
102 Mobil Oil Corp. v. City of Long Beach, 772 F.2d 534, 542 (9th Cir. 1985).
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In view of the Cone Court's emphasis that courts apply the
test "with the balance heavily weighted in favor of the exercise of
jurisdiction, '" 103 district courts are accorded greater discretion to
decline to abstain and instead retain jurisdiction. 10 Even so, at
least one court, over a strong dissent, found an abuse of discretion
in the district court's failure to abstain, while another court in a
recent decision has found an abuse of discretion in the district
court's abstention and dismissal.10 5
CONCLUSION
As aforementioned, the exceptional circumstances doctrine is
so open-ended that its application is far from uniform as indicated
by the variety of cases applying the doctrine. The circumstances in
some of these cases raise serious questions as to whether they are
exceptional, while others apparently come within the parameters
indicated by the Supreme Court. In the final analysis, the district
court must await more specific guidelines from the Supreme Court,
although it should be noted that this opportunity recently was
foregone in Roberts & Schaefer Co. v. Lake Coal Co..10 6 Until fur-
ther clarification by the Supreme Court of the guidelines for de-
clining federal jurisdiction in favor of parallel state litigation, it
appears that further confusion and litigation of this issue are cer-
tain to follow. In the meantime, the district court must rely upon
experience and common sense in applying the doctrine.
10' Cone, 460 U.S. at 16.
104 See United States v. Adair, 723 F.2d 1394, 1402-03 (9th Cir. 1983).
100 Microsoftware Computer Sys. v. Ontel Corp., 686 F.2d 531, 538 (7th Cir. 1982)
(Doyle, J., dissenting) (failure to abstain); Bethlehem Contracting Co. v. Lehrer-McGovern,
Inc., No. 86-7179, slip op. (2d Cir. Sept. 15, 1986) (abstention and dismissal).
106 751 F.2d 386 (6th Cir. 1984) (mem.), cert. granted, 105 S. Ct. 1841, dismissed as
moot, No. 84-1240, slip op. Dec. 3, 1985. The Supreme Court, after granting certiorari to
review the exceptional circumstances test, dismissed the case as moot, over both parties'
objections, because of a settlement. Id.
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